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Abstract
Following years of growth, the Thai economy began showing confidence-busting signs in
1996, including a liquidity crunch. In May 1997, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced that
it would expand the list of short-term assets that banks and finance companies could use to
satisfy the BOT’s liquidity reserve requirement, including obligations of the Financial
Institution Development Fund (FIDF), which provided liquidity support to illiquid financial
institutions. In the summer of 1997, the BOT suspended the operations of 58 finance
companies and floated the Thai baht (THB), unleashing the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC).
Tight liquidity conditions continued and, in September 1997, the BOT cut the RR on domestic
deposits from 7% to 6%. Thai officials said at the time that the lower RRR would result in an
increase of THB 51.6 billion (USD 1.52 billion) in cash held by banks and finance companies.
Companies could satisfy this reserve requirement by holding deposits at the BOT or by
holding public securities and bonds. The BOT repeatedly expanded the list of eligible reserve
assets. In July 1998, the BOT allowed holdings of the debt of banks and finance companies
that the government had consolidated to satisify the reserve requirement. The BOT made
further changes to the RR in 1998 and 1999, redefining “short-term foreign lending” and
lowering the portion of the RR that commercial banks were required to deposit with the BOT.
In April 1999, to support Thailand’s economic recovery, the BOT added loans to the ExportImport Bank of Thailand to the list of eligible reserve assets. Contemporaneous observers
were skeptical of the BOT’s reserve requirement policy, noting that it was insufficient to
reduce liquidity concerns and carried risks.
Keywords: Asian Financial Crisis, liquidity rules, reserve ratio, reserve requirements,
Thailand
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Overview
During the early 1990s, the Thai government
liberalized capital inflows and encouraged
banks to borrow abroad to finance domestic
activities through lending facilities called
Bangkok International Banking Facilities
(BIBFs) (Haksar and Giorgianni 2000;
Santiprabhob 2003). At the time, Thailand
maintained a fixed exchange rate between
the Thai baht (THB) and the US dollar (USD)
(Santiprabhob 2003).
In 1995, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) took
several measures to “slow credit growth,
restrict short-term capital inflows, and
reduce the inflationary impact of these
inflows” (Sharma 2013, 79). Among those
measures, the BOT required that commercial
banks hold liquid reserves—in BOT deposits,
government securities, or vault cash—equal
to at least 7% of their nonresident baht
deposits, with a maturity under one year
(Sharma 2013). Since 1974, the Bank of
Thailand had held commercial banks to a 7%
reserve requirement ratio (RRR) for their
domestic deposits (Dasri 1990). But this
requirement had not applied to foreign
deposits, a discrepancy that had encouraged
banks to raise funds from abroad (BOT
1997g). In April 1996, the BOT extended the
7% reserve requirement to nonresident baht
deposits of finance companies as well
(Sharma 2013).
Inside Thailand, large amounts of portfolio
growth made the country’s financial sector
vulnerable to a sudden decline in investor
confidence. In 1996, the midsize Bangkok
Bank of Commerce collapsed, followed by a
decline in exports, a slowdown in bank profit
growth, and a slump in real estate prices. The
burst real-estate bubble proved significant
because finance companies—Thai nonbank
lenders
that
took
deposits—had
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Key Terms
Purpose of Adjusting the Reserve Requirement
(RR): To “help improve money supply in the
financial system and solve liquidity problems many
financial institutions have been facing” (AP-Dow
Jones News Service 1997)
Range of RR Ratio
(RRR) Peak-toTrough

7%–6%

RRR Increase
Period

August 1995
(commercial banks)
April 1996
(finance companies)

RRR Decrease
Period

Domestic liabilities:
September 8, 1997
Nonresident liabilities:
July 1998

Legal Authority

Commercial Banking Act and
Finance Company Act

Interest/
Remuneration on
Reserves

Deposits with the BOT paid
no interest; however,
companies could meet most
of their RR with interestbearing assets

Notable Features

The BOT repeatedly
expanded the list of liquid
assets that healthy banks
could use to satisfy the
domestic RR—to support the
provision of liquidity to
illiquid or restructured
financial institutions, and to
fund more than 20
government agencies and
state enterprises

Outcomes

Expected to release
THB 51.6 billion
(USD 1.52 billion) in liquidity
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concentrated exposures to real estate and consumer loans (BOT 2003a; Nabi and
Shivakumar 2001).
During the first quarter of 1997, concerns about the capital adequacy and liquidity of
Thailand’s finance companies and small banks led to depositor runs. The BOT tasked the
Financial Institution Development Fund (FIDF) with providing liquidity support to illiquid
financial institutions (Santiprabhob 2003).
The BOT also revised its RR policies to help alleviate the credit crunch. On May 30, 1997, the
BOT began allowing banks to use loans to the FIDF to satisfy the domestic RR, which
remained at 7%. This change came into effect on June 24, 1997, for both financial institutions
and commercial banks. It created an avenue for relatively healthy institutions to meet the
RR. It also helped the FIDF fund its growing liquidity support for troubled finance companies,
which ultimately cost the government at least THB 244 billion (BOT 1997a; BOT 1997b;
Santiprabhob 2003; Sutham 1997).
In June 1997, the BOT suspended the operations of 16 finance companies, because of capitaladequacy concerns. Among these was Finance One, one of Thailand’s largest finance
companies (Santiprabhob 2003).
At the same time, between November 1996 and July 1997, currency speculators attacked the
baht three times, and the BOT defended it three times, initially ruling out devaluation (Nabi
and Shivakumar 2001). The BOT accumulated large forward positions that whittled its
international reserves from more than USD 39 billion in November 1996 to just over USD 1
billion in July 1997 (BOT 1998d). Given these circumstances and deteriorating confidence,
on July 2, 1997, the BOT abandoned the baht’s fixed exchange rate and floated it. The
subsequent depreciation of the baht marked the beginning of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC)
(Nabi and Shivakumar 2001). Following this depreciation, Thailand in August 1997 entered
into a 34-month Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
(Gov’t of Thailand 1997).
Also in August 1997, the BOT suspended 42 additional finance companies. With these
suspensions, the BOT attempted to end deposit runs, bring the FIDF’s liquidity support under
control, restore confidence, and eliminate market distortions (Santiprabhob 2003).
In spite of these actions, Thai financial institutions continued to face a liquidity crunch (APDow Jones News Service 1997). To ease these conditions, on September 8, 1997, the BOT cut
the domestic RR from 7% to 6% (BOT 1997c; BOT 1997d). For financial institutions, this
change came into effect on September 12, 1997, and was calculated weekly, as had been the
case previously (BOT 1997c). For commercial banks, the change came into effect on
September 8, 1997, and was calculated fortnightly, as had been the case prior to the change
(BOT 1997d). The breakdown of the required reserves for finance companies and
commercial banks also differed (BOT 1997e; BOT 1997f). Thai officials expected the relaxed
reserve requirements to increase liquidity by THB 51.6 billion (USD 1.52 billion) (Reuters
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1997b; AFP 1997).4 That same month, Thai officials also announced a blanket guarantee of
the deposits of banks and finance companies. They said that the FIDF had lent more than
THB 800 billion to struggling finance companies (BOT 2003b; BOT 2009; Santiprabhob
2003).
In October 1997, the government formalized the Financial Sector Restructuring Agency
(FRA), which reviewed the viability of the 58 suspended finance companies. Ultimately, in
December 1997, the FRA decided that only two institutions could resume their operations
(Santiprabhob 2003).
Meanwhile, the government began to consolidate failed commercial banks into new public
entities. Krung Thai Bank (KTB) and Krung Thai Thanakit Finance Company (KTT) absorbed
several formerly private entities and took over their existing liabilities (Santiprabhob 2003).
On July 6, 1998, the BOT announced further changes to the reserve requirements. KTB and
KTT debt became eligible for the RRR (BOT 1998b; BOT 1998a; Santiprabhob 2003). For
both finance companies and commercial banks, this change came into effect on July 8, 1998
(BOT 1998a; BOT 1998b).
Later in July 1998, the BOT brought the reserve requirements for nonresident deposits and
foreign borrowing into line with its domestic reserve requirements on bank deposits,
dropping the RRR to 6% (BOT 1999e). Finance companies, starting on July 31, 1998, were
required to hold 0.5% of deposits and foreign borrowing with the BOT and 4.5% in eligible
securities. Commercial banks and the BIBFs, beginning on August 8, 1998, were required to
hold 2% of their deposits and foreign borrowing with the BOT and 2.5% in eligible securities
(BOT 1998c).
In 1999, as the Thai economy began to stabilize, the BOT adopted further changes to the RR
(BOT 2000; World Bank 1999). On April 5, 1999, the BOT lowered the portion of the RRR
that it required commercial banks to deposit with the BOT from 2% to 1%. The BOT also
introduced procedures to maintain liquidity in commercial banks, such as allowing excess
reserves deposited at the BOT to carry over to the next fortnightly period and allowing
commercial banks that missed the RRR to make up the shortfall during the next RRR
calculation period. These changes were meant to reduce the cost to banks, given that
reserves were unremunerated (BOT 2000). These changes came into effect on April 23, 1999
(BOT 1999a).
In November 1998, the BOT announced a list of 21 government agencies and state-owned
enterprises whose debt or bonds commercial banks could use to meet the RRR. In April 1999,
it added the Export-Import Bank of Thailand to that list (BOT 1999c).

Per Bloomberg, on September 8, 1997, USD 1 = THB 33.9. Different news outlets, using different exchange
rates for the day, estimated that the change would free between USD 875 million and USD 1.55 billion (AFP
1997; Bardacke 1997).
4
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Summary Evaluation
Some scholars have said that the BOT’s RR policy in the years leading up to the AFC was “not
very effective” (Sharma 2013, 80). The BOT’s decisions in 1995 and 1996 to increase the RR
on nonresident baht deposits to 7%, in line with the longstanding RR on domestic deposits,
reduced the profitability of BIBF transactions and removed the incentive for banks and
finance companies to borrow overseas. BIBF transactions declined between 1996 and 1997.
However, the BOT’s actions did not succeed in stemming short-term capital inflows in those
pre-crisis years (Sharma 2013).
Following Thailand’s decision to cut the RRR on domestic deposits from 7% to 6% in
September 1997, analysts argued that the decision would free up some liquidity but would
likely be insufficient to bring down interbank lending rates (Amorn 1997). On the day the
policy was announced, the market showed little reaction, with the baht weaker and the
interbank lending rate only slightly changed (Reuters 1997a).
The BOT changed the RR for commercial banks in 1999, requiring them to deposit 1% of
their deposits and short-term borrowing with the BOT, as opposed to 2%. The BOT noted
that this change was meant to reduce the cost to commercial banks and the BIBFs, given that
their deposits were unremunerated, and could use the additional 1% in other eligible reserve
assets. The BOT also reported that the change to the cash RR had the effect of reducing the
demand for the monetary base by THB 46 billion. The BOT absorbed the extra liquidity, and
it said that the monetary base subsequently stabilized (BOT 2000).
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The BOT lowered reserve requirements to promote bank liquidity and
expanded the definition of eligible reserve assets to encourage healthy banks to
provide liquidity to illiquid banks, government agencies, and restructured banks
and finance companies owned by the government.
Following years of substantial capital inflows, Thailand began to show confidence-busting
signs in 1996, when the midsize Bangkok Bank of Commerce failed (Nabi and Shivakumar
2001). Thai economic conditions continued to deteriorate following this failure, and by the
first quarter of 1997, Thai institutions faced both a liquidity shortage and capital-adequacy
concerns. The Bank of Thailand (BOT) charged the Financial Institutions Development Fund
(FIDF) to provide liquidity support to illiquid institutions (Santiprabhob 2003). To further
provide liquidity support, the BOT allowed relatively healthy commercial banks and other
finance companies to use their holdings of FIDF debt instruments, or other debt instruments
guaranteed by the FIDF, to satisfy a portion of their 7% reserve requirement (RR) (BOT
1997a; BOT 1997b). “Eligible reserve assets also included government liabilities, and bonds
or debt issued by certain state-owned enterprises, government agencies, or the Industrial
Finance Corporation of Thailand” (Sutham 1997). In the summer of 1997, the BOT
suspended the operations of 58 finance companies and floated the baht (Nabi and
Shivakumar 2001).
In September, as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) spread, the BOT cut the RRR on domestic
deposits for finance companies and commercial banks to 6% to promote liquidity (AP-Dow
Jones News Service 1997; BOT 1997c; BOT 1997d). This change, the BOT estimated, would
result in an increase of THB 51.6 billion in cash held by banks and finance companies (AFP
1997; Reuters 1997b).
Throughout 1998, economic conditions worsened, and the Thai economy contracted 8%
(BOT 1999e). The BOT adopted further changes to the RR to aid banks during this
turbulence. In July 1998, the BOT allowed financial and commercial institutions to use their
holdings of the debt of KTB and KTT—two state-owned financial institutions resulting from
the merger of failed Thai banks and finance companies—to satisfy the RR (BOT 1998a; BOT
1998b). That same month, the BOT brought the RR for nonresident deposits and foreign
borrowing into line with its domestic RR on bank deposits, dropping the RR to 6% (BOT
1999e).
2. Part of a Package: Changes to the RR coincided with various policies meant to
forestall the Thai economy’s deterioration.
After allowing institutions to use FIDF liabilities to meet their RR, in June 1997, the BOT
suspended the operations of 16 finance companies (Santiprabhob 2003). A month later, after
fighting off several speculative attacks, the BOT floated the baht in July 1997, leading to
financial deterioration and forcing Thailand to enter into a 34-month Stand-By Arrangement
(SBA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Gov’t of Thailand 1997; Nabi and
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Shivakumar 2001). At the same time, the BOT suspended another 42 finance companies,
aiming to stop bank runs, control liquidity, restore market confidence, and eliminate market
distortions (Santiprabhob 2003).
Thai institutions continued to face deteriorating conditions even after these measures,
including a liquidity shortage, which prompted the BOT to cut its RR to 6% in September
1997 (AP-Dow Jones News Service 1997). The same day this was announced, the
government communicated that the 58 suspended institutions would be required to raise
their risk-asset-to-capital ratio to 15% (AP-Dow Jones News Service 1997). Officials also
announced that exporters could only hold dollar receivables for 120 days before converting
them into baht, a decrease from 180 days (Bardacke 1997; Reuters 1997b).
By October 1997, the government formalized the Financial Sector Restructuring Agency
(FRA) to examine the viability of the 58 suspended institutions, only two of which would
reopen. The government consolidated failed entities into the KTB and the KTT (Santiprabhob
2003). In July 1998, the BOT said that it would accept KTB and KTT debt to fulfill the RR (BOT
1998a; BOT 1998b). Revised capital-adequacy rules accompanied this change (BOT 1998a;
BOT 1998b).
Thai officials, in August 1998, announced the creation of the Thai Capital Support Facilities
to restore solvency and confidence to the Thai system (Kulam 2020; Santiprabhob 2003).
3. Legal Authority: The BOT used the Commercial Banking Act and the Financial
Company Act to alter the RR.
The BOT Act established the BOT as Thailand’s central bank (BOT Act [1985] 1942). The
Commercial Banking Act, passed in 1962, set out the regulations governing commercial
banks in Thailand (Commercial Banking Act 1962, preamble). Pursuant to Section 11 of the
Commercial Banking Act, the BOT could require that commercial banks held certain liquid
assets as it saw fit (Commercial Banking Act 1962, sections 11 ter-11 quinque). During the
AFC, changes to the liquidity rules governing commercial banks were made in accordance
with this provision. The Commercial Banking Act required the BOT to publish changes to
these liquidity rules and required that commercial banks submit information to the BOT
(Commercial Banking Act 1962, section 13, 15).
The Financial Company Act, originally passed in 1979, governed finance companies,
securities businesses, and mortgage lenders (known as credit fonciers) (Finance Company
Act 1979, preamble). Pursuant to section 28 of the Financial Company Act, the BOT could
require finance companies to maintain certain liquid assets and could set the ratio for such
assets (Finance Company Act 1979). Changes to the liquidity rules governing finance
companies were thus made according to this provision. The Financial Company Act also
required that finance companies submit information to the BOT and extended many of the
provisions governing financial institutions to mortgage lenders, including those governing
liquidity requirements (Finance Company Act 1979, sections 23, 56).
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4. Administration: The BOT set the RR. Commercial banks and finance companies
reported their reserves to the BOT.
Pursuant to Thai law, the BOT could require commercial banks and credit institutions to
maintain specific liquid assets at a given ratio (Commercial Banking Act 1962, section 11;
Finance Company Act 1979, section 28). Commercial banks were required to submit
information weekly to the BOT, including information related to banks’ assets (BOT Act
[1985] 1942, section 33). Commercial banks also reported information to the BOT on a
monthly basis (Commercial Banking Act 1962, section 15). Finance companies were also
required to submit information to the BOT (Finance Company Act 1979, section 23).
From the sources consulted, it is unclear which specific BOT body decided upon the RR.
5. Governance: A court of directors governed the BOT. It is not clear how the BOT set
the RR.
It is unclear how the BOT set its RR or how the BOT oversaw such changes. However, it is
likely that a team in the BOT’s monetary stability group set the RRR, under the supervision
of a governor and deputy-governor (BOT 2000, 123). When the BOT changed its liquidity
rules, it needed to do so per the BOT’s rules, and then it was required to receive the minister
of finance’s approval (Commercial Banking Act 1962, section 11 quinque). For instance, both
the minister of finance and the governor of the BOT announced the RR changes in September
1997 (AP-Dow Jones News Service 1997; AFP 1997).
The BOT would publish these changes in the Government Gazette (Commercial Banking Act
1962, section 11 quinque). Normally, if the BOT increased its RR, the requirement would
come into effect 15 days after its publication in the Government Gazette; however, with the
minister of finance’s approval, the rule could come into effect at the end of a given day,
circumventing this 15-day grace period (Commercial Banking Act 1962, section 11 quinque,
sex).
Thailand’s minister of finance exercised general supervisory powers over the BOT (BOT Act
[1985] 1942, section 14). A court of directors, which included the governor of the BOT, the
deputy-governor of the BOT, and at least five other members, governed the BOT (BOT Act
[1985] 1942, section 15). The governor and the deputy-governor managed the day-to-day
affairs of the BOT (BOT Act [1985] 1942, section 16). If the governor disagreed with the court
of director’s majority decision, the minister of finance would decide the matter in question
(BOT Act [1985] 1942, section 17).
6. Communication: The BOT announced changes to its RR through published
circulars and explained them further in its annual reports.
The BOT announced changes to its RR through circulars, which were published. Thailand’s
finance minister, Thanong Bidaya, and the BOT governor, Chaiyawat Wibulswasdi,
announced the RR changes adopted on September 8, 1997. Thanong said that, by cutting the
RR from 7% to 6%, liquidity conditions would likely loosen, helping institutions that faced
liquidity shortages (AFP 1997; AP-Dow Jones News Service 1997).
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The BOT also used its annual reports to communicate the purpose of its RR changes. In 1997,
the BOT noted that it had raised the RR against foreign short-term borrowing before the
crisis to eliminate the incentive for commercial banks to borrow from abroad in “massive
amounts” (BOT 1997g, 37). In 1999, the BOT explained the reasoning behind later RR
alterations, which were then meant to reduce the cost on banks and to comply with
international standards (BOT 2000).
7. Assets Qualifying as Reserves: The BOT repeatedly expanded the list of liquid
assets that healthy banks could use to satisfy the domestic RR—to support the
provision of liquidity to illiquid or restructured financial institutions, and to fund
more than 20 government agencies and state enterprises.
Before the Asian Financial Crisis, the domestic RR for both commercial banks and finance
companies was 7% (BOT 1997a; BOT 1997b). However, eligible reservable assets differed
for the two types of companies.
•

Commercial banks were required to deposit 2% of this 7% with the BOT. Banks also
had to hold 2.5% of the 7% in unencumbered government assets (BOT 1997b).5

•

Finance companies were required to hold 0.5% of the 7% as a cash deposit with the
BOT (BOT 1997a). They were required to maintain 5.5% of the RRR in unencumbered
government assets (BOT 1997a).

Finance companies and commercial banks, once these requirements were met, could deposit
the rest with the BOT or hold additional eligible deposits, securities, or bonds (BOT 1997a;
BOT 1997b).
In May 1997, the BOT expanded the list of unencumbered assets that banks and financial
companies could use to fulfill the domestic RRR, allowing institutions to use loans to the FIDF
to satisfy the RR (BOT 1997a; BOT 1997b). The FIDF, which provided liquidity and capital
support to illiquid or undercapitalized financial institutions, ultimately lost at least THB 244
billion, following the failure of 56 financial companies (Santiprabhob 2003).
On September 8, 1997, the BOT cut the RRR on domestic liabilities for both commercial
banks and finance companies to 6% (AP-Dow Jones News Service 1997; BOT 1997c; BOT
1997d). After the change:
•

The BOT continued to require that commercial banks deposit 2% of this 6% with the
BOT and to hold an additional 2.5% in unencumbered government securities and
bonds (BOT 1997f).

Unencumbered government assets included treasury bills, government bonds, debt instruments guaranteed
by the Ministry of Finance, debt instruments issued by the FIDF, debt instruments or debentures guaranteed
(as to principal and interest) by the FIDF, and/or debentures or bonds issued by certain state-owned
enterprises, government agencies, or the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (BOT 1997e; Sutham
1997).
5

585

Thailand

Vergara and Runkel

•

The BOT required finance companies to hold 0.5% of the 6% RRR with the BOT and
4.5% in unencumbered government assets (BOT 1997e).

As had been the case earlier, once the reserve requirement was satisfied, institutions could
deposit the remaining reserves with the BOT or hold eligible deposits or assets (BOT 1997e;
BOT 1997f).
At that time, the BOT left the RRR for nonresident deposits and foreign borrowing at 7%. In
July 1998, the BOT brought the RRR for nonresident deposits and foreign borrowing into line
with its domestic RR on bank deposits, dropping the RR to 6% (BOT 1999e).
Also in July 1998, the BOT expanded the list of assets that could fulfill the 6% RRR to include
KTB and KTT debt, which was backed by the government (BOT 1998a; BOT 1998b).
In April 1999, while the domestic RRR remained at 6%, the BOT announced that commercial
banks would only need to deposit 1% of the 6% with the BOT (BOT 1999a). Pursuant to Thai
law, if banks did not meet their reserve requirement, the BOT could take action to ensure
that the bank complied with the RR (Commercial Banking Act 1962, section 22). This
included fining banks (Commercial Banking Act 1962, section 44). Commercial banks were
still required to hold 2.5% of the 6% in unencumbered government assets (BOT 1999a).
Furthermore, that same month, the BOT released a revised list of institutions whose debt
and bonds could satisfy the reserve requirement for commercial banks. This included 21
additional state enterprises, whose debt and bonds would be important to Thailand’s
economy recovery, such as the export sector (BOT 1999c).
8. Reservable Liabilities: The BOT required banks to hold reserves against deposits
and foreign short-term borrowing; it required finance companies to also hold
reserves against borrowing from the public.
The BOT required banks and finance companies to hold reserves against specified liabilities.
For commercial banks, the BOT used deposits and foreign short-term borrowing maturing
within one year to calculate individual RRs; for finance companies, the BOT used deposits,
foreign short-term borrowing, and all borrowing from the public (BOT 1997a; BOT 1997b;
BOT 1999a; BOT 1999b).
9. Computation: The BOT calculated the RR on deposits and short-term borrowing.
The maintenance period differed for finance companies and commercial banks.
Cash deposits at the BOT and unencumbered eligible liquid reserve assets were averaged
over the end-of-day values of each day. Commercial banks had to meet the RRR over a twoweek maintenance period (BOT 1997b; BOT 1997f). Finance companies had to meet the RRR
over a weekly maintenance period (BOT 1997a; BOT 1997e).
The cash deposits with the BOT, along with the total of unencumbered eligible assets, were
averaged daily at the end of each day (BOT 1997e; BOT 1997f).
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The maintenance period for finance companies and commercial banks differed. Finance
companies met the RRR over a weekly maintenance period (BOT 1997a; BOT 1997e).
Commercial banks met the RRR over a fortnightly maintenance period (BOT 1997b; BOT
1997f).
10. Eligible Institutions: Commercial banks, finance companies, and mortgage lenders
were required to hold reserves and liquid assets.
Commercial banks, including the BIBF, and other financial institutions operating in Thailand
were required to hold liquid assets and comply with the RR. Commercial banks were subject
to one set of liquidity rules, while finance companies and mortgage lenders were subject to
another set of liquidity rules (BOT 1997a; BOT 1997b; Commercial Banking Act 1962, section
11; Finance Company Act 1979, section 28).
In 1996, leading into the AFC, the Thai system had 91 finance companies and 15 banks. By
August 1997, the BOT had suspended the operations of 58 finance companies (Santiprabhob
2003).
11. Timing: The BOT lowered reserve requirements as it launched a host of other
programs.
On May 30, 1997, the BOT added the FIDF as an issuer whose debt could satisfy reserve
requirements (BOT 1997a; BOT 1997b). That same week, outstanding debt from finance
companies to the FIDF totaled at least THB 175.5 billion.6 The amount of FIDF bonds held by
finance companies and commercial banks, the primary holders of debt, totaled THB 33
billion (BOT 2003b; BOT 2009). The BOT could advance the FIDF reserves, and it exacted
mandatory member fees from Thai banks. However, the BOT appears not to have advanced
the FIDF reserves, and mandatory fees were capped at just 0.1% of bank deposits (World
Bank 1997).
The BOT lowered the RR on finance companies and commercial banks on September 7, 1997,
when it announced new regulations governing 58 suspended institutions (AP-Dow Jones
News Service 1997). Months earlier, in July and August, Thailand had been forced to float the
baht and sign an SBA with the IMF, as its economic situation worsened (Gov’t of Thailand
1997; Nabi and Shivakumar 2001). Nevertheless, Thai institutions continued to face a
liquidity crunch into September (AP-Dow Jones News Service 1997). These conditions also
prompted Thai officials to enact other policies, such as a blanket deposit guarantee.
In July 1998, the BOT announced that KTB and KTT debt could be used to satisfy the RR. This
decision corresponded to a program of consolidation of failed entities, which ultimately
received government backing (BOT 1998a; BOT 1998b; Santiprabhob 2003).

6 This figure is complicated by the fact that borrowings by commercial banks are not disaggregated into FIDF

and BOT borrowings, only BOT borrowings. Consequently, the figure may be THB 48.4 billion higher.
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12. Changes in Reserve Requirement Ratio: The BOT lowered the RRR on domestic
liabilities from 7% to 6% in September 1997 and lowered the RRR on nonresident
deposits and foreign borrowing from 7% to 6% in July 1998.
In September 1997, the BOT cut its domestic RRR for finance companies and commercial
banks from 7% to 6% (AP-Dow Jones News Service 1997; BOT 1997c; BOT 1997d). Thai
officials expected the change to release THB 51.6 billion in liquidity (AFP 1997; Reuters
1997b). In July 1998, the BOT brought the RRR for nonresident deposits and foreign
borrowing into line with its domestic RRR on bank deposits, dropping the RRR to 6% (BOT
1999e).
Deposit/Savings/Term Rates
For commercial banks, the RRR was 7%, and later 6%, on all deposits and on foreign shortterm borrowing due within 365 days of the borrowing date and those repayable or recallable
with 365 days. For finance companies and mortgage lenders, the RRR was 7%, later 6%, on
deposits, foreign short-term borrowing due within 365, and all borrowing from the public
(BOT 1997a, 4; BOT 1997b, 4; BOT 1999a; BOT 1999b).7
In July 1998, the BOT cut the RRR for nonresident baht deposits and foreign borrowing to
6%, bringing it in line with the domestic RRR (BOT 1999e).
Local/Foreign Currency Rates
The BOT exempted short-term borrowing from foreign countries made in foreign currency
from the RRR (BOT 1997a; BOT 1997b).
Marginal Requirement
The sources consulted suggest that the BOT did not have such a requirement.
13. Changes in Interest/Remuneration on Reserves: The BOT allowed companies to
hold most of their required reserves in interest-bearing assets, but did not
remunerate the portion deposited at the BOT.
Reserves deposited with the BOT were not remunerated (BOT 2000). However, as noted in
Key Design Decision No. 7, Assets Qualifying as Reserves, the BOT allowed companies to hold
most of their required reserves in interest-bearing assets. In April 1999, the BOT adjusted
the portion of reserves that it required commercial banks to hold on deposit with the BOT
from 2% to 1% (BOT 1999a).

7 This definition was later changed to account for

leap years, replacing “365 days” with “1 year,” so as to include

“366 days” (BOT 1999d).
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14. Other Restrictions: The BOT placed no other requirements on participants.
Sources consulted do not indicate that additional conditions accompanied changes to
Thailand’s RR.
15. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The BOT took no actions to counteract
the increase in the money supply.
The BOT expected that changes to its RR would increase money supply and help Thai
institutions facing a credit crunch (AP-Dow Jones News Service 1997). From the sources
consulted, it seems that the BOT took no action to sterilize this increase.
16. Duration: The BOT did not announce an end date to its RR changes.
The BOT’s announcements of RR adjustments did not include end dates. The RRR remained
at 6% until 2016 (Tuncharoen 2015).
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